IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/reveco/reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_3_409912.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Le pilotage des formes organisationnelles hybrides

Author

Listed:
  • Claude Ménard

Abstract

[fre] Le pilotage des formes organisationnelles hybrides. . Cet article porte sur les formes organisationnelles « hybrides ». L'idée directrice est qu'il existe une modalité spécifique de pilotage de ces formes, destinée à palier les insuffisances des relations contractuelles particulières qui lient les partenaires dans leurs transactions. Prenant appui sur des études récentes, on fait apparaître le rôle clé de l'autorité comme mode d'allocation des ressources assurant, sous certaines conditions, l'efficacité de la forme hybride par rapport à d'autres arrangements.On examine aussi le rôle que joue ce mécanisme dans le partage de la rente. [eng] The governance of hybrid organizational forms. . This paper analyzes « hybrid » organizational forms. The main idea is that hybrid forms are a distinctive governance structure, implemented in order to sup­plement incomplete contractual relationships developed among partners involved in joint transactions. Based on recent and ongoing studies, the paper explores the key role of authority in the capacity of hybrid forms, under certain conditions, to allocating resources more efficiently than other arrangements. The paper also examines the role of this mechanism in the sharing of rents among partners.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Ménard, 1997. "Le pilotage des formes organisationnelles hybrides," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 741-750.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_3_409912
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1997.409912
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1997.409912
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/reco.1997.409912
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_3_409912
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/reco.1997.409912?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-361, October.
    2. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    3. North, Douglass C., 1971. "Institutional Change and Economic Growth," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 118-125, March.
    4. Knoeber, Charles R, 1989. "A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 271-292, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Claude Ménard, 2012. "Hybrid Modes of Organization. Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and Other 'Strange' Animals," Post-Print halshs-00624291, HAL.
    2. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00624291 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Lise Arena & Eamonn Molloy, 2010. "The Governance Paradox in Megaprojects," Post-Print halshs-00721622, HAL.
    4. Camille Chaserant, 2007. "Autorité et flexibilité : quand la théorie des options interroge," Working Papers hal-04139207, HAL.
    5. Jean‐Michel Glachant, 2008. "La Deregulation Des Industries De Reseaux Comme Politique Institutionnelle De Creation De Marches Et De Mecanismes De Gouvernance," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3‐4), pages 487-525, September.
    6. Raynaud, Emmanuel & Sauvee, Loïc, 1999. "Common labelling and producer organisations: a transaction cost economics approach," 67th Seminar, October 28-30, 1999, LeMans, France 241743, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    7. Hernandez-Sanchez, Alberto, 2005. "Fresh Fruit Producers Organizations in France: The Impact of HACCP and ISO 9000 Standards Adoption," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 40, March.
    8. Giacomini, Corrado & Mancini, Maria Cecilia, 2015. "Organisation as a key factor in Localised Agri-Food Systems (LAFS)," Bio-based and Applied Economics Journal, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-16, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martinez, Stephen W., 2002. "Vertical Coordination Of Marketing Systems: Lessons From The Poultry, Egg, And Pork Industries," Agricultural Economic Reports 34051, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    2. Lajili, Kaouthar & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2005. "Revisiting Agency and Transaction Costs Theory Predictions on Vertical Financial Ownership and Contracting: Electronic Integration as an Organizational Form Choice," Working Papers 05-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    3. Hideshi Itoh, 2006. "The Theories of International Outsourcing and Integration : A Theoretical Overview from the Perspective of Organizational Economics," Microeconomics Working Papers 21891, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    4. Temin, Peter & Maxwell, James, 2003. "Corporate contracting for health care," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 403-420, November.
    5. Rodrigo Martins & Fernando Ribeiro Serra & André da Silva Leite & Manuel Portugal Ferreira & Dan Li, 2010. "Transactions Cost Theory influence in strategy research: A review through a bibliometric study in leading journals," Working Papers 61, globADVANTAGE, Polytechnic Institute of Leiria.
    6. Mahoney, Joseph T. & McNally, Regina C., 2004. "Explaining and Predicting the Choice of Organizational Form: Integrating Performance Ambiguity and Asset Specificity Effects," Working Papers 04-0109, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    7. Gonzalez-Diaz, Manuel & Arrunada, Benito & Fernandez, Alberto, 2000. "Causes of subcontracting: evidence from panel data on construction firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 167-187, June.
    8. Manuel González & Benito Arruñada & Alberto Fernández, 1997. "La decisión de subcontratar: el caso de las empresas constructoras," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 21(3), pages 501-521, September.
    9. Hermano, Víctor & Martín-Cruz, Natalia, 2013. "How to Deliver Foreign Aid? The Case of Projects Governed by the Spanish International Agency," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 298-314.
    10. Wagner, Stefan, 2006. "Make-or-Buy Decisions in Patent Related Services," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 1264, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
    11. Garg, Shresth & Ghosh, Pulak & Tan, Brandon Joel, 2023. "Within firm supply chains: Evidence from India," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    12. Stéphane Saussier, 2000. "Coûts de transaction et choix contractuels : un test économétrique sur une entreprise publique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 169-180.
    13. Hodaka Morita & Maroš Servátka, 2016. "Does Group Identity Prevent Inefficient Investment in Outside Options? An Experimental Investigation," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Organizational Economics, volume 19, pages 105-126, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    14. Sorrell, Steve, 2007. "The economics of energy service contracts," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 507-521, January.
    15. Gow, Hamish R. & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2002. "Investment, and Contract Hold-Ups in Transition: Evidence from Hungary," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24853, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    16. Boroumand, Raphaël Homayoun & Zachmann, Georg, 2012. "Retailers' risk management and vertical arrangements in electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 465-472.
    17. Alex Eapen & Rekha Krishnan, 2019. "Transferring Tacit Know-How: Do Opportunism Safeguards Matter for Firm Boundary Decisions?," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(4), pages 715-734, July.
    18. Loredo, Enrique & Suarez, Eugenia, 2000. "The governance of transactions: Joskow's coal-burning generating plants example revisited," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 107-114, February.
    19. Scott Shane, 2001. "Organizational Incentives and Organizational Mortality," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 136-160, April.
    20. Ji, Chen & de Felipe, Isabel & Briz, Julian & Trienekens, Jacques H., 2012. "An Empirical Study on Governance Structure Choices in China´s Pork Supply Chain," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 15(2), pages 1-32, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_3_409912. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/reco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.