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Asymétries d'information et incertitude en santé : les apports de la théorie des contrats

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  • Lise Rochaix

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[fre] Asymétries d'information et incertitude en santé : les apports de la théorie des contrats . par Lise Rochaix . Le caractère imparfait, voire asymétrique, de l'information dont dispose le patient conduit à remettre en cause l'utilisation du modèle néoclassique standard et à appliquer les modèles micro-économiques de type Principal - Agent. L'objet de cet article est de dresser un bilan des applications récentes au secteur de la santé de la théorie des contrats. Si cette dernière offre une grille de lecture pertinente, elle est toutefois demeurée peu opérationnelle, essentiellement en raison de la fragmentation des décisions sur le marché des soins. Il convient donc de s'interroger sur la portée et les limites de ce type d'approche. Cette démarche apparaît d'autant plus importante que de nouvelles familles de modèles théoriques, de type multi-principaux, multi-agents ou avec tiers offrent aujourd'hui des perspectives rénovées d'application au champ de la santé. [eng] Information Asymmetry and Health Uncertainty: The Contribution of Contract Theory . by Lise Rochaix . The imperfect and even asymmetric nature of the information at the patient's disposal calls into question the use of the standard neo-classical model and has led to application of microeconomic principal-agent models. This paper sets out to assess recent applications of contract theory to the health sector. Although the latter offers a relevant model of interpretation, it is still of relatively little use, mainly because of the fragmentation of decisions relating to the health-care market. The scope and limitations of such an approach must therefore be examined. This is all the more important in that new families of theoretical models involving multiple principals, multiple agents or third parties are now offering fresh angles of application to the field of health.

Suggested Citation

  • Lise Rochaix, 1997. "Asymétries d'information et incertitude en santé : les apports de la théorie des contrats," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 11-24.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1997_num_129_3_5861
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1997.5861
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1997.5861
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    3. Nicolas Da Silva, 2020. "Quantifier la qualité des soins. Une critique de la rationalisation de la médecine libérale française," Revue française de socio-Economie, La découverte, vol. 0(en lutte), pages 261-280.
    4. Bruno Ventelou, 1999. "Les dépenses de santé des Français : une maladie d'amour?," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 71(1), pages 247-280.
    5. Philippe Batifoulier, 1999. "Éthique professionnelle et activité médicale: une analyse en termes de conventions," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 2(2), pages 5-24, June.
    6. Barile, Sergio & Saviano, Marialuisa & Polese, Francesco, 2014. "Information asymmetry and co-creation in health care services," Australasian marketing journal, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 205-217.
    7. Sophie Bejean, 1997. "The foundations of the new theories in health economics [Les fondements des nouvelles théories en économie de la santé]," Working Papers hal-01526956, HAL.
    8. Lydie Ancelot & Cornel Oros, 2015. "Physician–patient relationship and medical accident victim compensation: some insights into the French regulatory system," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 16(5), pages 529-542, June.

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