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The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care

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Blomqvist, Ake

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 411-432
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:10:y:1991:i:4:p:411-432

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

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  1. Udo Schneider, 2004. "Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Health Care - the Case of Double Moral Hazard," HEW 0409001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Martin Gaynor, 1995. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," NBER Working Papers 4695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Paula González, 2005. "On a policy of transferring public patients to private practice," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 513-527. [Downloadable!]
  4. Tambour, Magnus & Rehnberg, Clas, 1997. "Internal Markets and Performance in Swedish Health Care," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 161, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Marie Allard & Pierre Thomas Léger & Lise Rochaix, 2004. "Provider Competition in a Dynamic Setting," Cahiers de recherche 04-07, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gerdtham, Ulf-G. & Rehnberg, Clas & Tambour, Magnus, 1997. "The Impact of Internal Markets on Health Care Efficiency: Evidence from Health Care Reforms in Sweden," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 170, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Paula González, 2002. "Policy Implications Of Transferring Patients To Private Practice," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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