Patient knowledge and antibiotic abuse: Evidence from an audit study in China
AbstractWe conduct an audit study in which a pair of simulated patients with identical flu-like complaints visits the same physician. Simulated patient A is instructed to ask a question that showcases his/her knowledge of appropriate antibiotic use, whereas patient B is instructed to say nothing beyond describing his/her symptoms. We find that a patient who displays knowledge of appropriate antibiotics use reduces both antibiotic prescription rates and drug expenditures. Such knowledge also increases physicians’ information provision about possible side effects, but has a negative impact on the quality of the physician–patient interactions. Our results suggest that antibiotics abuse in China is not driven by patients actively demanding antibiotics, but is largely a supply-side phenomenon.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.
Volume (Year): 30 (2011)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560
Antibiotics; China; Physician; Prescription;
Other versions of this item:
- Janet Currie & Wanchuan Lin & Wei Zhang, 2010. "Patient Knowledge and Antibiotic Abuse: Evidence from an Audit Study in China," NBER Working Papers 16602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Production
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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