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Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery

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Author Info
Jonathan Gruber
Maria Owings

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Abstract

The "induced-demand" model states that in the face of negative income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care. We test this model using an exogenous change in the financial environment facing obstetrician/

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199621%2927%3A1%3C99%3APFIACS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 99-123
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:27:y:1996:i:spring:p:99-123

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Web page: http://www.rje.org

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grytten, Jostein & Holst, Dorthe & Laake, Peter, 1990. "Supplier inducement : Its effect on dental services in Norway," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 483-491, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. David E. Bloom & James Trussell, 1983. "What Are the Determinants of Delayed Childbearing and Permanent Childlessness in the United States?," NBER Working Papers 1140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thomas G. McGuire & Mark V. Pauly, 1991. "Physician Response to Fee Changes with Multiple Payers," Papers 0015, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  4. McGuire, Thomas G. & Pauly, Mark V., 1991. "Physician response to fee changes with multiple payers," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 385-410. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Victor R. Fuchs, 1978. "The Supply of Surgeons and the Demand for Operations," NBER Working Papers 0236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cromwell, Jerry & Mitchell, Janet B., 1986. "Physician-induced demand for surgery," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 293-313, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Goddeeris, John H, 1984. "Medical Insurance, Technological Change, and Welfare," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 56-67, January.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, 2005. "Market Distortions when Agents are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions," NBER Working Papers 11053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Leo Turcotte & John Robst & Solomon Polachek, 2006. "Medical interventions among pregnant women in fee-for-service and managed care insurance: a propensity score analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 38(13), pages 1513-1525, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Daniele Fabbri & Chiara Monfardini, 2006. "Style of practice and assortative mating: a recursive probit analysis of cesarean section scheduling in Italy," CHILD Working Papers wp06_06, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Etienne Dumont & Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce S. Shearer, 2008. "Physicians’ Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-20, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2008. "Policy Analysis in the health-services market: accounting for quality and quantity," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00305309_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Anupa Bir & Karen Eggleston, 2003. "Physician Dual Practice: Access Enhancement or Demand Inducement?," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0311, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Geir Godager & Tor Iversen & Ching-To Ma, 2009. "Service motives and profit incentives among physicians," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 39-57, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Gabrielle Demange & Pierre-Yves Geoffard, 2006. "Reforming incentive schemes under political constraints: the physician agency," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 83-84, pages 09, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Janet Currie & Jonathan Gruber, 1997. "The Technology of Birth: Health Insurance, Medical Interventions, and Infant Health," NBER Working Papers 5985, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Arrieta, Alejandro, 2007. "A Structural Misclassifcation Model to Estimate the Impact of Physician Incentives on Healthcare Utilization," MPRA Paper 6718, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  11. Wayne Dunham, 2003. "Moral Hazard and the Market for Used Automobiles," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 65-83, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Leo Turcotte & John Robst & Solomon Polachek, 2005. "Medicaid Coverage and Medical Interventions During Pregnancy," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-271, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jonathan Skinner & John E. Wennberg, 1998. "How Much is Enough? Efficiency and Medicare Spending in the Last Six Months of Life," NBER Working Papers 6513, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Ron Borzekowski, 2002. "Measuring the cost impact of hospital information systems: 1987-1994," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-42, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  15. Jon Gruber & John Kim & Dina Mayzlin, 1998. "Physician Fees and Procedure Intensity: The Case of Cesarean Delivery," NBER Working Papers 6744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 12478, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Paul Ellickson & Scott Stern & Manuel Trajtenberg, 1999. "Patient Welfare and Patient Compliance: An Empirical Framework for Measuring the Benefits from Pharmaceutical Innovation," NBER Working Papers 6890, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Christopher C. Afendulis & Daniel P. Kessler, 2006. "Tradeoffs from Integrating Diagnosis and Treatment in Markets for Health Care," NBER Working Papers 12623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Jonathan Skinner & John Wennberg, 2000. "Regional Inequality in Medicare Spending: The Key to Medicare Reform?," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1017-1017. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition," Working Papers 2009-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
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