This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Chalkley, M.
Malcomson, J.M.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 9510.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:stn:sotoec:9510

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ
Phone: (+44) 23 80592537
Fax: (+44) 23 80593858
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Chris Thorn).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. François MARECHAL & Michel MOUGEOT, 2004. "Risk sharing and moral hazard under prospective payment to hospitals: how to reimburse services for outlier patients," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 04.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
  2. Luigi Siciliani, 2007. "Optimal Contracts for Health Services in the Presence of Waiting Times and Asymmetric Information," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1661-1661. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Udo Schneider, 2005. "Asymmetric Information and Outcome-based Compensation in Health Care – Theoretical Implications," HEW 0501006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kurt R. Brekke & Roberto Cellini & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2008. "Competition and quality in regulated markets: a differential-game approach," Discussion Papers 08/05, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Rossella Levaggi & Michele Moretto & Vincenzo Rebba, 2007. "Investment decisions in hospital technology when physicians are devoted workers," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0048, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
  6. Oddvar Martin Kaarboe & Luigi Siciliani, 2008. "Multitasking, quality and pay for performance," Discussion Papers 08/06, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Alessandra Ferrari, 2004. "The payment of hospital services: a waiting lists model," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2004-25, School of Business, Reading University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Dr. Alessandra Ferrari, 2005. "The Payment of Hospital Services: a Waiting Lists Model," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1426-1426. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Siciliani, Luigi, 2007. "Paying for Performance with Altruistic or Motivated Providers," CEPR Discussion Papers 6452, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Michele Moretto & Rosella Levaggi, 2004. "Investment in Hospital Care Technology under Different Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach," Working Papers 2004.75, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2007. "Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion," CEPR Discussion Papers 6261, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Ana, MAULEON & Laurent, COUDEVILLE & Benoit, DERVAUX, 2004. "Prospective payment system : consequences for hospital-physician interactions in the private sector," Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper 2004011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  13. Avi Dor & Mark V. Pauly & Margaret A. Eichleay & Philip J. Held, 2007. "End-stage Renal Disease and Economic Incentives: The International Study of Health Care Organization and Financing," NBER Working Papers 13125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Gauri, Varun, 2001. "Are incentives everything? payment mechanisms for health care providers in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2624, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  15. Rudy Douven, . "Regulated Competition in Health Insurance Markets," Research memoranda 171, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create your own reading lists on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.