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Is The Assumption Of Voters Rationality Just A Myth?

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Author Info
Dalibor Roháč

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Abstract

This paper discusses recent claims made by Caplan (2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2002, 2007) who argues that democracies produce bad policies as a result of voters' irrational beliefs. We start by outlining the motives which led Caplan to amend classic Public Choice in such a radical fashion. We analyse the likely repercussions that his hypothesis might have on the future of the profession. We provide a critique of Caplan's distinction between experts and ordinary people and we conclude by suggesting an important degree of caution in interpreting Caplan's results and in providing any policy advice based on his hypothesis.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Politická ekonomie.

Volume (Year): 2009 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 163-176
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Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2009:y:2009:i:2:id:679:p:163-176

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Related research
Keywords: rational ignorance; public choice; homogeneity of agents; analytical egalitarianism;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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