Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy
AbstractBrennan and Hamlin [(2002) Constitutional Political Economy 13(4): 299--311] noted that expressive voting still holds at the constitutional phase. The argument, when taken to its necessary conclusion, proves quite problematic for Constitutional Political Economy. Veil mechanisms following Buchanan induce expressive voting at the constitutional phase, removing the normative benefits ascribed to the hypothetical unanimity principle. If the constitution is authored by a small group and the veil is thereby removed, instrumental considerations come to bear and the authors of the constitution establish themselves as Oligarch.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 15 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
Other versions of this item:
- Eric Crampton & Andrew Farrant, 2004. "Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy," Public Economics 0401002, EconWPA.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
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