The Statistical Basis of Athenian-American Constitutional Theory
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 18 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- George Tridimas, 2012. "Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-21, March.
- Makowsky, Michael, 2009.
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- Dalibor Roháč, 2009. "Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse? A public choice perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 160-176, June.
- Eric Crampton & Andrew Farrant, 2004.
"Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy,"
Constitutional Political Economy,
Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 77-88, 03.
- Eric Crampton & Andrew Farrant, 2004. "Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy," Public Economics 0401002, EconWPA.
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