Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice
AbstractThe political economy of Ludwig von Mises and Frederic Bastiat has been largely ignored even by their admirers. We argue that Mises' and Bastiat's views in this area were both original and insightful. While traditional public choice generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views are rational but ignored, the Mises-Bastiat view is that democracy fails because voters' views are irrational but heeded. Mises and Bastiat anticipate many of the most effective criticisms of traditional public choice to emerge during the last decade and point to many avenues for future research.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Review of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 17 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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