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The Politics of Market Socialism

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Author Info
Shleifer, Andrei
Vishny, Robert W

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Abstract

The debate over market socialism has ignored the importance of the assumptions about the objectives of politicians in determining resource allocation. Theory and evidence suggest that totalitarian socialism does not lead to efficient resource allocation because dictators do not maximize social welfare. But democratic governments have political objectives different from social welfare as well. The authors argue that because these governments command greater resources (have more control rights) under socialism, democratic socialism (even if it could exist) is a less efficient system than democratic capitalism. Thus the political case against market socialism is even stronger than the economic case. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 8 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Pages: 165-76
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:2:p:165-76

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