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The Politics of Market Socialism

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  • Andrei Shleifer
  • Robert W. Vishny

Abstract

The debate over market socialism has ignored the importance of the assumptions about the objectives of politicians in determining resource allocation. Theory and evidence suggest that totalitarian socialism does not lead to efficient resource allocation because dictators do not maximize social welfare. But democratic governments have political objectives different from social welfare as well. The authors argue that because these governments command greater resources (have more control rights) under socialism, democratic socialism (even if it could exist) is a less efficient system than democratic capitalism. Thus the political case against market socialism is even stronger than the economic case.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.8.2.165
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 8 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Pages: 165-176

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:2:p:165-76

Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.2.165
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Cited by:
  1. Chong-en Bai & Yijang Wang, 1997. "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why is Good Money Thrown after Bad?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 347., Boston College Department of Economics.
  2. Argandoña, Antonio, 2000. "Sobre la corrupción," IESE Research Papers D/418, IESE Business School.
  3. Aidt, Toke & Jayasri Dutta, 2002. "Policy compromises: corruption and regulation in a dynamic democracy," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 1, Royal Economic Society.
  4. Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1995. "A Theory of the Soft-Budget Constraint," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 298., Boston College Department of Economics.
  5. Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Whither Russia? A Review of Andrei Shleifer's A Normal Country," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(1), pages 127-146, March.
  6. Argandoña, Antonio, 2004. "Corruption and companies: The case of facilitating payments," IESE Research Papers D/539, IESE Business School.
  7. Antunes, Davi, 2004. "Valoração Ambiental e Meio Ambiente: Uma Visão Crítica
    [Environmental Valuation and Environment: A Critical Assessment]
    ," MPRA Paper 48929, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2004.
  8. Alexandre Rands, 2005. "The Impact of States Owned Banks on Interest Rates Spread," Working Papers 42, Datamétrica Consultoria Econômica, revised 2005.
  9. Guriev, Sergei & Rachinsky, Andrei, 2006. "The Evolution of Personal Wealth in the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe," Working Paper Series RP2006/120, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  10. Dic Lo & Russell Smyth, 2004. "Towards a re-interpretation of the economics of feasible socialism," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(6), pages 791-808, November.
  11. João Carvalho Santos & Manuel Portugal Ferreira & Nuno Rosa Reis & Martinho Ribeiro Almeida, 2012. "Mergers & acquisitions research: A bibliometric study of top strategy and international business journals," Working Papers 91, globADVANTAGE, Polytechnic Institute of Leiria.
  12. Aidt, T.S. & Dutta, J., 2008. "A Theory of the Corrupt Keynesian," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0861, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  13. Yong Wang & Xuewen Liu & Xi Li, 2013. "A Model of China's State Capitalism," 2013 Meeting Papers 853, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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