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Robust political economy

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  • Peter Leeson

    ()

  • J. Subrick

    ()

Abstract

This paper introduces the idea of “robust political economy.” In the context of political economic systems, “robustness” refers to a political economic arrangement's ability to produce social welfare-enhancing outcomes in the face of deviations from ideal assumptions about individuals' motivations and information. Since standard assumptions about complete and perfect information, instantaneous market adjustment, perfect agent rationality, political actor benevolence, etc., rarely, if ever actually hold, a realistic picture and accurate assessment of the desirability of alternative political economic systems requires an analysis of alternative systems' robustness. The Mises-Hayek critique of socialism forms the foundation for investigations of robustness that relax ideal informational assumptions. The Buchanan-Tullock public choice approach complements this foundation in forming the basis for investigations of robustness that relax ideal motivational assumptions. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11138-006-7342-7
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal The Review of Austrian Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 107-111

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Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:19:y:2006:i:2:p:107-111

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100335

Related research

Keywords: Austrian economics; Public choice; Robustness;

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Cited by:
  1. Everard Cowan & Roger Koppl, 2011. "An experimental study of blind proficiency tests in forensic science," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 251-271, September.
  2. Daniel D’Amico, 2012. "Comparative political economy when anarchism is on the table," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 63-75, March.
  3. Berggren, Niclas, 2011. "Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics," Ratio Working Papers 166, The Ratio Institute.
  4. Nikolai Wenzel, 2014. "Lessons from Constitutional Culture and the History of Constitutional Transfer: A Hope for Constitutionally Limited Government?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 213-226, May.
  5. Boettke, Peter, 2011. "Teaching economics, appreciating spontaneous order, and economics as a public science," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 265-274.
  6. Dean Stansel, 2012. "Competition, knowledge, and local government," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 243-253, September.
  7. Boettke, Peter & Smith, Daniel, 2011. "Robust political economy and the Federal Reserve," MPRA Paper 32092, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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