Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics
AbstractCan corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption might influence the efficiency of the rule of law. While Chicago Public Choice scholars model how corruption improves efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency, the Virginia Public Choice models explain how corruption reduces efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency. In this paper, we present a brief survey distinguishing among arguments of the Chicago Public Choice and Virginia Public Choice schools on how corruption influences economic efficiency. We present selected quasi-experimental anecdotic evidence of bureaucratic corruption from the early period of transition in the Czech and Slovak Republics to support the argument that the Virginia Public Choice explanation is more realistic because it includes the influence of bureaucratic corruption.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics in its series MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics with number 2011-13.
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Bureaucracy; corruption; economic efficiency; Chicago Public Choice; Virginia Public Choice; rent-seeking; rule of law;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- P3 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2011-11-01 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2011-11-01 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gordon Tullock, 1996. "Corruption Theory And Practice," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 6-13, 07.
- J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004.
"Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint,"
N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
- J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 11.
- J�nos Kornai & Eric Maskin & G�rard Roland, 2003. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1095-1136, December.
- Rottenberg, Simon, 1975. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization: Comment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 611-15, December.
- Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
- Bowles, Roger & Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 75-87, March.
- Kornai, Janos, 1986. "The Soft Budget Constraint," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 3-30.
- Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
- Banfield, Edward C, 1975. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 587-605, December.
- Reder, Melvin W, 1975. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization: Comment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 607-09, December.
- Richard A. Posner, 1974.
"Theories of Economic Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
0041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February.
- Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. " Corruption and Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 97-125, October.
- Cull, Robert & Matesova, Jana & Shirley, Mary, 2002. "Ownership and the Temptation to Loot: Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-24, March.
- Levy, David M, 1990. " The Bias in Centrally Planned Prices," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 213-26, December.
- Jain, Arvind K, 2001. " Corruption: A Review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 71-121, February.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
- Anderson, Gary M & Boettke, Peter J, 1997. " Soviet Venality: A Rent-Seeking Model of the Communist State," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(1-2), pages 37-53, October.
- Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luděk Kouba).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.