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School-Based Educational Accountability Systems: The Promise and the Pitfalls

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  • Ladd, Helen F.

Abstract

This article discusses schools as the primary unit of accountability and how school performance is measured and examines whether school-based accountability and incentive programs increase student achievement and how they impact the behavior of principals.

Suggested Citation

  • Ladd, Helen F., 2001. "School-Based Educational Accountability Systems: The Promise and the Pitfalls," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(2), pages 385-400, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:54:y:2001:i:2:p:385-400
    DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2001.2.09
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    1. Ladd, Helen F., 1999. "The Dallas school accountability and incentive program: an evaluation of its impacts on student outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-16, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. William Duncombe & Anna Lukemeyer & John Yinger, 2008. "The No Child Left Behind Act," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(4), pages 381-407, July.
    2. Tavares, Priscilla Albuquerque, 2015. "The impact of school management practices on educational performance: Evidence from public schools in São Paulo," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-15.
    3. Julie Berry Cullen & Randall Reback, 2006. "Tinkering Toward Accolades: School Gaming Under a Performance Accountability System," NBER Working Papers 12286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Winters, Marcus A. & Trivitt, Julie R. & Greene, Jay P., 2010. "The impact of high-stakes testing on student proficiency in low-stakes subjects: Evidence from Florida's elementary science exam," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 138-146, February.
    5. Constant I. Tra & Anna Lukemeyer & Helen Neill, 2013. "Evaluating The Welfare Effects Of School Quality Improvements: A Residential Sorting Approach," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 607-630, October.
    6. David N. Figlio & Marianne E. Page, 2003. "Can School Choice and School Accountability Successfully Coexist?," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of School Choice, pages 49-66, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Claus M. Hoerandner & Robert J. Lemke, 2006. "Can No Child Left Behind Close The Gaps In Pass Rates On Standardized Tests?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 1-17, January.
    8. David N. Figlio & Lawrence S. Getzler, 2002. "Accountability , Ability and Disability: Gaming the System," NBER Working Papers 9307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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