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False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate

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  • Franklin Mixon
  • Rand Ressler
  • M. Gibson

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  • Franklin Mixon & Rand Ressler & M. Gibson, 2009. "False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 83-95, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:138:y:2009:i:1:p:83-95
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9340-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nelson, Phillip, 1976. "Political Information," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 315-336, August.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:2:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Robert B. Ekelund & Franklin G. Mixon & Rand W. Ressler, 1995. "Advertising and information: an empirical study of search, experience and credence goods," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 22(2), pages 33-43, May.
    4. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    5. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2002. "Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 263-280, June.
    6. Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, 2013. "Legislatures," Chapters, in: William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini & Michael Reksulak (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition, chapter 9, pages 143-152, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Franklin G. Mixon Jr. & Rand W. Ressler & M. Troy Gibson, 2003. "Congressional Memberships as Political Advertising: Evidence from the U.S. Senate," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(2), pages 414-424, October.
    8. Anon, 2002. "The Economy of Influence," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 34(8), pages 1331-1332, August.
    9. Ferguson, James M, 1976. "Political Information: Comment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 341-346, August.
    10. Edelman, Susan A., 1988. "Televised legislatures: Political information technology and public choice : W. Mark Crain and Brian L. Goff, (Kluwer, Boston, 1988)," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 394-395.
    11. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "Are Contributions Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 647-664, June.
    12. Jia-wei Li, 2005. "On cheap talk in games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(2), pages 1-5.
    13. Gregory m. Dempster & Christopher Westley, 2000. "Who gets the goods? Moderate Voting Records, Diminishing Returns, and PAC Contributions," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 321-333, November.
    14. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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    Cited by:

    1. Franklin G. Mixon & Chandini Sankaran & Kamal P. Upadhyaya, 2019. "Is Political Ideology Stable? Evidence from Long-Serving Members of the United States Congress," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-19, May.
    2. Robert B. Ekelund & Mark Thornton, 2019. "Extreme Credence and Imaginary Goods," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 47(3), pages 361-371, September.

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