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A Game-Theoretic Explanation on Legislative Inefficiency in Korea

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  • Yong-Ju Lee

    (Research Institute of Insurance and Finance, Samsung)

Abstract

Legislative inefficiency, which is being magnified in Korea, is phenomenologically characterized by two noticeable features: (i) rapid increase of the number of bills introduced by the government in the narrow sense and (ii) sharp decline of the approval rate by the legislature during the same period. Based on this observation, we examine the role of incomplete information in the revelation of legislative inefficiency through a standard signaling game. We might understand legislative inefficiency as a shift to a Semi-separating equilibrium under incomplete information from a Separating equilibrium under complete information, and explain why this understanding is persuasive by examining institutional changes and their effects in Korea.

Suggested Citation

  • Yong-Ju Lee, 2011. "A Game-Theoretic Explanation on Legislative Inefficiency in Korea," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 27, pages 293-309.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20111231-27-2-06
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 118-149, March.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legislative inefficiency; Signaling game; Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; Separating Equilibrium; Pooling Equilibrium; Semi-separating Equilibrium; Cho and Kreps’ Intuitive Criterion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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