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Pricing Moral Hazard in Residential Properties: The Impact of Sinkhole Claims on House Prices

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  • Randy E. Dumm

    (Temple University)

  • Charles Nyce

    (College of Business, Florida State University)

  • G. Stacy Sirmans

    (College of Business, Florida State University)

  • Greg T. Smersh

    (University of South Florida)

Abstract

Previous research shows that sinkhole presence, proximity, and density create negative externalities and all have a significant negative effect on house prices. This study extends sinkhole research by examining opportunistic fraud and moral hazard associated with the relationship between sinkhole insurance claims and house prices. This is done by evaluating the relationship between house prices and the payment or denial of sinkhole insurance claims for both affected properties and neighboring properties. Applying a spatial error regression model to single-family detached home sales and sinkhole insurance claims data for Hillsborough County, Florida for the period 2008 to 2016, we find that not only do sinkhole insurance claims have a negative impact on the property associated with the claim, but also have a negative impact on surrounding properties regardless of the source of classification. This result holds for both paid and unpaid insurance claims. The results also show a price discount even after the sinkhole has been remediated.

Suggested Citation

  • Randy E. Dumm & Charles Nyce & G. Stacy Sirmans & Greg T. Smersh, 2022. "Pricing Moral Hazard in Residential Properties: The Impact of Sinkhole Claims on House Prices," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 30-70, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:64:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11146-020-09804-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-020-09804-2
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    2. Emilio Ramírez-Juidías & José-Lázaro Amaro-Mellado & Jorge Luis Leiva-Piedra, 2022. "Influence of the Urban Green Spaces of Seville (Spain) on Housing Prices through the Hedonic Assessment Methodology and Geospatial Analysis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-15, December.

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