The Optimal Duration of Real Estate Listing Contracts
AbstractThe length of the real estate listing contract is examined as a means of providing an incentive for brokers to act in the best interest of home sellers. A limitation on the duration of the contract accomplishes this objective by imposing a cost (namely, the foregone commission) on brokers who fail to complete a sale before the contract expires. The seller's optimal contract duration balances the benefits of improved incentives against the expected cost of renegotiating a new contract in the event of a failure bv the broker. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association in its journal Real Estate Economics.
Volume (Year): 17 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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