The length of the real estate listing contract is examined as a means of providing an incentive for brokers to act in the best interest of home sellers. A limitation on the duration of the contract accomplishes this objective by imposing a cost (namely, the foregone commission) on brokers who fail to complete a sale before the contract expires. The seller's optimal contract duration balances the benefits of improved incentives against the expected cost of renegotiating a new contract in the event of a failure bv the broker. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association in its journal Real Estate Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)