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Optimal Compensation Contracts with Pay-For-Performance and Termination Incentives Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Greg Hallman
Jay C. Hartzell
This paper studies optimal compensation contracts in the presence of both pay-for-performance and termination incentives. While these incentives have been studied independently, this paper’s model is the first to incorporate both. The primary result is
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Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- in its series New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires with number
99-053.
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Date of creation: Dec 1999Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-053Contact details of provider: Postal: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126 Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1992.
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