Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action
AbstractA significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government policy. Government action - - tax reform, deregulation, judicial decisions, budgetary shifts - - produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules. The effects of government relief - - compensation, grandfathering, phase-ins - - on ex ante incentives and risk bearing are examined in a model in which private insurance is taken into account. It is demonstrated that government relief is inefficient, even when private insurance is subject to moral hazard, because relief shields individuals from some of the effects of their actions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3006.
Date of creation: Jun 1989
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Scandanavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 525-541 (1992).
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Other versions of this item:
- Kaplow, Louis, 1992. " Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(4), pages 525-41.
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