Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action

Contents:

Author Info

  • Louis Kaplow

Abstract

A significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government policy. Government action - - tax reform, deregulation, judicial decisions, budgetary shifts - - produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules. The effects of government relief - - compensation, grandfathering, phase-ins - - on ex ante incentives and risk bearing are examined in a model in which private insurance is taken into account. It is demonstrated that government relief is inefficient, even when private insurance is subject to moral hazard, because relief shields individuals from some of the effects of their actions.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w3006.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3006.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jun 1989
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Scandanavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 525-541 (1992).
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3006

Note: PE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1982. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Commodity Taxation," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 500, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. Zodrow, George R., 1985. "Optimal tax reform in the presence of adjustment costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 211-230, July.
  3. Louis Kaplow, 1985. "Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle," NBER Working Papers 1679, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Arnott, Richard J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. " The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(3), pages 383-413.
  5. Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
  6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  7. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1991. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 3588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Kaplow, Louis, 1989. "Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 42(2), pages 139-54, June.
  9. Kaplow, Louis, 1993. "An ex ante perspective on deregulation, viewed ex post," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 153-173, June.
  10. Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November.
  11. Arrow, Kenneth J & Lind, Robert C, 1970. "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 364-78, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ackerman, Frank & Biewald, Bruce & White, David & Woolf, Tim & Moomaw, William, 1999. "Grandfathering and coal plant emissions: the cost of cleaning up the Clean Air Act," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(15), pages 929-940, December.
  2. Metcalf, Gilbert E., 2013. "Using the Tax System To Address Competition Issues with a Carbon Tax," Discussion Papers, Resources For the Future dp-13-30, Resources For the Future.
  3. Louis Kaplow, 2003. "Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework," NBER Working Papers 9596, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Steven Shavell, 2014. "Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change," NBER Working Papers 19879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  6. Louis Kaplow, 2010. "Taxes, Permits, and Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 16268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.