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Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data

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Author Info
Jaap H. Abbring (Free University Amsterdam)
Pierre-André Chiappori (University of Chicago)
Jean Pinquet (Université Paris X-Nanterre)

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Abstract

This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazard. We first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence under moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We then show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish this moral-hazard effect from dynamic selection on unobservables. We develop nonparametric tests and estimate a flexible paramet-ric model. We find no evidence of moral hazard in French car insurance. Our analysis contributes to a recent literature based on static data that has problems distinguishing between moral hazard and selection and dealing with dynamic features of actual insurance contracts. Methodologically, this paper builds on and extends the literature on state dependence and heterogeneity in event-history data. (JEL: D82, G22, C41, C14) Copyright (c) 2003 The European Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 1 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (06)
Pages: 767-820
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:1:y:2003:i:4:p:767-820

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  1. Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating moral hazard from adverse selection in automobile insurance : longitudinal evidence from France," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 12289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2006. "Testing for Adverse Selection with "Unused Observables"," NBER Working Papers 12112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jaap Abbring & Gerard van den Berg, 2005. "Social experiments and instrumental variables with duration outcomes," IFS Working Papers W05/19, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Grönqvist, Erik, 2006. "(M)oral Hazard?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 642, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Mette Ejrnaes & Stefan Hochguertel, 2008. "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-065/3, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  8. Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, 2007. "Estimating the Effect of a Change in Insurance Pricing Regime on Accidents with Endogenous Mobility," Cahiers de recherche 0728, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Mette Ejrnæs & Gabriel Stefan Hochguertel, 2008. "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance: Empirical Evidence from a Large Administrative Sample," CAM Working Papers 2008-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Gine, Xavier & Townsend, Robert & Vickery, James, 2007. "Patternsof rainfall insurance participation in rural India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4408, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Anja Deelen, 2005. "Adverse selection in disability insurance: empirical evidence for Dutch firms," CPB Discussion Papers 46, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  12. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Mark R. Cullen, 2008. "Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices," NBER Working Papers 14414, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Breustedt, Gunnar & Larson, Donald F., 2006. "Mutual Crop Insurance and Moral Hazard: The Case of Mexican Fondos," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25552, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  14. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2006. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from eBay," Working Papers 06-32, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Sokbae 'Simon' Lee, 2003. "Estimating panel data duration models with censored data," CeMMAP working papers CWP13/03, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," NBER Working Papers 10363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Shawn Cole & Xavier Giné & Jeremy Tobacman & Petia Topalova & Robert Townsend & James Vickery, 2009. "Barriers to household risk management: evidence from India," Staff Reports 373, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  18. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Paul Schrimpf, 2007. "The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," NBER Working Papers 13228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2007. "Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data," Working Papers hal-00243056_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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