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Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data

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Author Info

  • Jean Pinquet

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Georges Dionne

    (HEC Montréal)

  • Charles Vanasse

    (TD Asset Management)

  • Mathieu Maurice

    (HEC Montréal)

Abstract

Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont soit monétaires (amendes, primes d'assurance), soit non monétaires (permis à points). Nous utilisons des données québécoises couvrant une période allant de 1983 à 1996 pour analyser l'efficacité incitative de ces mécanismes. Nous analysons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement. Nous comparons l'efficacité globale des différents mécanismes incitatifs et nous relions les résultats obtenus avec les propriétés de la relation entre l'effort de conduite prudente et le risque d'infractions. Nous concluons à la présence d'aléa moral dans les données. Par ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points introduite en 1992 a réduit de 15% la fréquence d'infractions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00243056.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243056

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  1. John D. Graham & Steven Garber, 1984. "Evaluating the effects of automobile safety regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 3(2), pages 206-224.
  2. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
  3. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2007. "Point-record driving licence and road safety : an economic approach," Post-Print hal-00243024, HAL.
  4. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation And Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 8831, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  5. Alma Cohen, 2005. "Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 197-207, May.
  6. Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, 06.
  7. Dionne, G. & Vanasse, C., 1988. "A Generalization Of Automobile Insurance Rating Models: The Negative Binomial Distribution With A Regression Component," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 8833, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  8. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
  9. Boyer, Marcel & Dionne, Georges, 1987. "The economics of road safety," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 413-431, October.
  10. Dionne, Georges & Lasserre, Pierre, 1985. "Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 719-23, October.
  11. Chiappori, P.A. & Macho, I. & Rey, P. & Salanié, B., 1989. "Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Access to Credit Markets," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 89-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  12. G. Dionne & M. Maurice & J. Pinquet & C. Vanasse, 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard : Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers 2001-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  13. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 584-92, September.
  14. Boyer, Marcel & Dionne, Georges, 1989. "An Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard and Experience Rating," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 71(1), pages 128-34, February.
  15. Sloan, Frank A & Reilly, Bridget A & Schenzler, Christoph, 1995. "Effects of Tort Liability and Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 49-77, April.
  16. Puelz, Robert & Snow, Arthur, 1994. "Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 236-57, April.
  17. Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 2001. "Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 444-473, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, 2007. "Estimating the effect of a change in insurance pricing regime on accidents with endogenous mobility," Cahiers de recherche 07-11, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  2. Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet & Denise Desjardins, 2007. "Predicted risk perception and risk-taking behavior: The case of impaired driving," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 237-264, December.

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