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Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment

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Author Info
Georges Dionne
Christian Gourieroux
Charles Vanasse

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File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JPE019209
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 109 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 444-473
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:109:y:2001:i:2:p:444-473

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  1. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 12289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Ari Hyytinen & Mika Pajarinen, 2005. "External Finance, Firm Growth and the Benefits of Information Disclosure: Evidence from Finland," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 69-93, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ari Hyytinen & Mika Pajarinen, 2003. "External Finance, Firm Growth and the Benefits of Information Disclosure: Evidence from Finland (Revised)," Discussion Papers 805, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  5. G. Dionne & M. Maurice & J. Pinquet & C. Vanasse, 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard : Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers 2001-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Symmetric Information in an Agency Model with Moral Hazard: The Ex Ante Case," Economics Series 2006_23, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  7. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2007. "Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data," Working Papers hal-00243056_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  9. Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating moral hazard from adverse selection in automobile insurance : longitudinal evidence from France," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2006. "Testing for Adverse Selection with "Unused Observables"," NBER Working Papers 12112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ari Hyytinen & Lotta Väänänen, 2004. "Could Mr. and Mrs. Capital Market Imperfection Please Step Forward? An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Capital Markets," Discussion Papers 887, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  12. Grönqvist, Erik, 2006. "(M)oral Hazard?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 642, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Jason Strauss & Aidan Hollis, 2007. "Insurance Markets When Firms Are Asymmetrically Informed: A Note," Working Papers 2007-18, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 30 Nov 2007. [Downloadable!]
  14. Aloisio Araujo & Humberto Moreira, 2001. "Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences," Textos para discussão 449, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  15. G. Dionne, 2001. "Commitment and Automobile Insurance in France, Quebec and Japan," THEMA Working Papers 2001-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  16. Dardanoni, V & Li Donni, P, 2008. "Testing For Asymmetric Information In Insurance Markets With Unobservable Types," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 08/26, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
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