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Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data

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Author Info

  • Jean Pinquet

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Georges Dionne

    (HEC Montréal - HEC MONTRÉAL)

  • Charles Vanasse

    (TD Asset Management)

  • Mathieu Maurice

    (HEC Montréal - HEC MONTRÉAL)

Abstract

Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont par exemple des amendes, des primes d'assurance ou des permis à points. Nous analysons l'efficacité incitative de ces mécanismes. Nous obtenons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement avec des données issues du système public d'assurance au Québec. Nous concluons à la présence d'aléa moral dans les données, qui traduit le fait que les conducteurs qui accumulent les points deviennent plus prudents car ils sont plus sous risque de perdre leur permis. Par ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points introduite en 1992 a réduit de 15% la fréquence d'infractions. Nous utilisons ce résultat pour calculer des équivalents monétaires pour les infractions et les retraits de permis.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00414479.

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Date of creation: 09 Sep 2009
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00414479

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Related research

Keywords: Mécanismes incitatifs; permis à points; sécurité routière;

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Cited by:
  1. Jean Pinquet, 2012. "Experience rating in non-life insurance," Working Papers hal-00677100, HAL.
  2. Chandler, Vincent, 2012. "Assessing the Impact of Deterrence on Road Safety due to the Demerit Point System," MPRA Paper 39439, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Benedettini, Simona & Nicita, Antonio, 2012. "The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the ‘Peltzman effect’ in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 256-270.
  4. Heni Boubaker & Nadia Sghaier, 2014. "How Do the Interest Rate and the Inflation Rate Affect the Non-Life Insurance Premiums ?," Working Papers 2014-282, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  5. Antonio Nicita & Simona Benedettini, 2012. "The Costs of Avoiding Accidents.Selective Compliance and the 'Peltzman Effect' in Italy," Department of Economics University of Siena 631, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  6. Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
  7. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
  8. Marcello Basili & Filippo Belloc & Simona Benedettini & Antonio Nicita, 2012. "Warning, Learning and Compliance: Evidence from Micro-data on Driving Behavior," Department of Economics University of Siena 639, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  9. Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche 1233, CIRPEE.

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