In this paper, we estimate the impact of introducing a bonus-malus system on the probability of having automobile accidents, taking into account contract duration or the client mobility between insurers. We show that the new incentive scheme reduces accident rates of all policyholders when contract duration is taken into account, but does not affect accident rates of movers that shirk the imposed incentive effects of the new insurance pricing scheme.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply J29 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Other C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data
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Verbeek, Marno & Nijman, Theo, 1992.
"Testing for Selectivity Bias in Panel Data Models,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(3), pages 681-703, August.
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