IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/crcrmw/2021_003.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Road safety for fleets of vehicles

Author

Listed:
  • Dionne, Georges

    (HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management)

  • Desjardins, Denise

    (HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management)

  • Angers, Jean-François

    (University of Montreal)

Abstract

Road safety for fleets of vehicles has been neglected in the insurance literature, mainly because appropriate data is not available. This paper makes a threefold contribution: 1) Produce statistics on current fleets’ road safety offences using a panel of 20 years of data on truck fleets; 2) relate these offences to fleets’ accidents; and 3) identify and classify the riskiest fleets for insurance ratemaking based on past experience in managing road safety. Our results show a substantial heterogeneity between fleets in terms of road safety.

Suggested Citation

  • Dionne, Georges & Desjardins, Denise & Angers, Jean-François, 2021. "Road safety for fleets of vehicles," Working Papers 21-3, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:crcrmw:2021_003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.risksresearch.com/_files/ugd/a6eed3_942cdc8c82974caab0d67bac1d52368b.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elvik, Rune, 2013. "Paradoxes of rationality in road safety policy," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 62-70.
    2. Mullahy, John, 1986. "Specification and testing of some modified count data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 341-365, December.
    3. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
    4. Georges Dionne & Ying Liu, 2021. "Effects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(2), pages 453-477, April.
    5. Denise Desjardins & Georges Dionne & Yang Lu, 2023. "Hierarchical random‐effects model for the insurance pricing of vehicles belonging to a fleet," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(2), pages 242-259, March.
    6. Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, June.
    7. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
    8. Hausman, Jerry & Hall, Bronwyn H & Griliches, Zvi, 1984. "Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 909-938, July.
    9. Angers, Jean-François & Desjardins, Denise & Dionne, Georges & Guertin, François, 2018. "Modelling And Estimating Individual And Firm Effects With Count Panel Data," ASTIN Bulletin, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 1049-1078, September.
    10. Steven Shavell, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 541-562.
    11. Angers, Jean-François & Desjardins, Denise & Dionne, Georges & Guertin, François, 2006. "Vehicle and Fleet Random Effects in a Model of Insurance Rating for Fleets of Vehicles," ASTIN Bulletin, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 25-77, May.
    12. Michael D. Creel & John B. Loomis, 1990. "Theoretical and Empirical Advantages of Truncated Count Data Estimators for Analysis of Deer Hunting in California," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 72(2), pages 434-441.
    13. Majo, M.C. & van Soest, A.H.O., 2011. "The Fixed-Effects Zero-Inflated Poisson Model with an Application to Health Care Utilization," Discussion Paper 2011-083, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Georges Dionne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Maki Dahchour, 2013. "Separating Moral Hazard From Adverse Selection And Learning In Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence From France," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 897-917, August.
    15. Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, June.
    16. Savage, Ian, 2011. "A structural model of safety and safety regulation in the truckload trucking industry," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 249-262, March.
    17. Georges Dionne & Jean-François Angers & Denise Desjardins, 2015. "Étude des comportements de sécurité routière des propriétaires, exploitants et conducteurs des véhicules lourds au Québec," Cahiers de recherche 1507, CIRPEE.
    18. Georges Dionne (ed.), 2013. "Handbook of Insurance," Springer Books, Springer, edition 2, number 978-1-4614-0155-1, September.
    19. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dionne, Georges, 2012. "The empirical measure of information problems with emphasis on insurance fraud and dynamic data," Working Papers 12-10, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    2. Sebastian Soika, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Advantageous Selection in Private Disability Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(1), pages 97-125, January.
    3. Xiaoqi Zhang & Yi Chen & Yi Yao, 2021. "Dynamic information asymmetry in micro health insurance: implications for sustainability," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(3), pages 468-507, July.
    4. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    5. Ciprian MatiÅŸ & Eugenia MatiÅŸ, 2013. "Asymmetric Information In Insurance Field: Some General Considerations," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 1(15), pages 1-17.
    6. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
    7. repec:ipf:psejou:v:42:y:2018:i:42:p:45-65 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Hao Zheng & Yi Yao & Yinglu Deng & Feng Gao, 2022. "Information asymmetry, ex ante moral hazard, and uninsurable risk in liability coverage: Evidence from China's automobile insurance market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(1), pages 131-160, March.
    9. Pavel A. Yakovlev & Christina M. Orr-Magulick, 2018. "On the road again: traffic fatalities and auto insurance minimums," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 42(1), pages 45-65.
    10. Georges Dionne & Casey G. Rothschild, 2011. "Risk Classification in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1137, CIRPEE.
    11. Shi, Peng & Valdez, Emiliano A., 2011. "A copula approach to test asymmetric information with applications to predictive modeling," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 226-239, September.
    12. Bedsworth, Fredrick & Neal, Daniel R. & Portillo, Javier E. & Willardsen, Kevin, 2021. "Asymmetric information and insurance: An experimental approach," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    13. Bernard Salanié, 2017. "Equilibrium in Insurance Markets: An Empiricist’s View," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(1), pages 1-14, March.
    14. Spindler, Martin, 2013. "“They do know what they are doing... at least most of them.†Asymmetric Information in the (private) Disability Insurance," MEA discussion paper series 201209, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
    15. Georges Dionne & Ying Liu, 2021. "Effects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(2), pages 453-477, April.
    16. Imen Karaa, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Learning in the Tunisian Automobile Insurance Market: New Evidence from Dynamic Data," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(3), pages 560-589, July.
    17. Daniel Bauer & Jochen Russ & Nan Zhu, 2020. "Asymmetric information in secondary insurance markets: Evidence from the life settlements market," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1143-1175, July.
    18. David Rowell & Son Nghiem & Luke B Connelly, 2017. "Two Tests for Ex Ante Moral Hazard in a Market for Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1103-1126, December.
    19. Spindler, M., 2014. "“They do know what they are doing ... at least most of them.†Asymmetric Information in the (private) Disability Insurance," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 14/16, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    20. Feng Gao & Michael R. Powers & Jun Wang, 2017. "Decomposing Asymmetric Information in China's Automobile Insurance Market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1269-1293, December.
    21. Hyojoung Kim & Doyoung Kim & Subin Im & James W. Hardin, 2009. "Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market: Dichotomous Versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 343-366, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Road safety; truck fleets; professional drivers; road safety infractions; road safety policy; zero-inflated model; negative binomial model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:crcrmw:2021_003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Claire Boisvert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/hecmtca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.