Risk aversion influence on insurance market
AbstractHuman behavior, rational or irrational one, influences one of the most complex markets worldwide: the insurance market. In most situations, insurance markets are not competitive and risk neutral insurers negotiate under asymmetric information with actors who exhibit risk aversion. In this paper we develop a game theory model that analyzes the negotiation of an insurance contract under risk aversion conditions (in static and dynamic approach). Risk aversion influence was introduced in the model by intermediary of a discount factor (the in equivalent to players’ patience) instead of using a utility function. The main conclusion is that the customer prefers to agree on a contract of insurance in the first stage of negotiation than having to wait for another round of negotiations, during which they could register various losses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37725.
Date of creation: 13 Nov 2011
Date of revision: 01 Feb 2012
contract negotiations; model; insurance; dynamic game; risk aversion; discount factor;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-05-08 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2012-05-08 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2012-05-08 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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