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Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics de Meza, David
Webb, David C
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This article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision. Risk-tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure, but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer, more risk-averse types. Taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients, allowing a strict Pareto gain. This result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies, as does the novel finding of a pure-strategy, partial-pooling, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the insurance market. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.
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Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics .
Volume (Year): 32 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 249-62
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:32:y:2001:i:2:p:249-62Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.rje.org
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