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Optimal income taxation and social norms in the labor market

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  • Thomas Aronsson

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  • Tomas Sjögren
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    Abstract

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-008-9100-1
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

    Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 1 (February)
    Pages: 67-89

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:17:y:2010:i:1:p:67-89

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

    Related research

    Keywords: Optimal taxation; Redistribution; Social interaction; Norms; D60; H21; H53;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Lindbeck, A., 1994. "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Papers 589, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    2. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörg Weibull, 2003. "Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics," CESifo Working Paper Series 931, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Lindbeck, Assar, 1995. "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Working Paper Series 441, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    4. J. Solnick, Sara & Hemenway, David, 1998. "Is more always better?: A survey on positional concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 373-383, November.
    5. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1982. "Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation," NBER Working Papers 0632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Falk, Armin & Knell, Markus, 2004. "Choosing the Joneses: Endogenous Goals and Reference Standards," IZA Discussion Papers 1152, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Annegrete Bruvoll & Karine Nyborg, 2004. "The Cold Shiver of Not Giving Enough: On the Social Cost of Recycling Campaigns," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(4).
    8. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2008. "When the Joneses' consumption hurts: Optimal public good provision and nonlinear income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 986-997, June.
    9. Howarth, Richard B., 2006. "Optimal environmental taxes under relative consumption effects," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 209-219, June.
    10. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October.
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    Cited by:
    1. Aronsson, Thomas & Granlund, David, 2013. "Gender Norms, Work Hours, and Corrective Taxation," HUI Working Papers 83, HUI Research.
    2. Robin Boadway & Nicolas-Guillaume Martineau, 2013. "Normative Analysis with Societal Constraints," CESifo Working Paper Series 4305, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Ruggero Paladini, 2014. "Da Bentham alla tassazione ottimale," Public Finance Research Papers 2, Istituto di Economia e Finanza, DIGEF, Sapienza University of Rome.

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