The effects of both habit formation and status concerns are analyzed within a model with short-lived households and a long-lived public good, environmental quality. Status seeking induces households to raise consumption of goods and leisure, and pollution, and to lower environmental quality. Habits exacerbate the social costs of status seeking. Efficient tax programs exist and are analyzed. Status seeking and habits are shown to raise efficient consumption and income tax rates. Moreover, an allocation induced by a sequence of short-lived governments is considered. The more important habits and status, to more mistakenly short-lived governments set tax rates relative to efficient rates. However, in case there exists a long-lived institution, when governments are short-lived, the competitive economy can be induced to attain the efficient allocation by a specific tax-transfer program. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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