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Regulation of Non-Point Emissions – A Variance Based Mechanism

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Lars Hansen ()

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Abstract

Non-point emission problems such as pesticide, nitrate, and phosphorus pollution of lakes and ground water are often characterised by a small number of polluters, convex damage functions, and stochastic emissions. Some regulatory mechanisms proposed in the literature for stochastic non-point emissions implement the optimal abatement vector in dominant strategies (ensuring that non-Nash conjectures cannot be rationalized). However, specification of these mechanisms requires firm level information and differentiated rates when the damage function is convex. Other mechanisms eliminate the need for firm level information and rate differentiation, but only implement optimum in Nash strategies (where non-Nash conjectures, that cause equilibrium to stray from optimum, can be rationalized). In this paper we propose a mechanism which eliminates the need for firm level information and rate differentiation, while retaining implementation in dominant strategies. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1015140602916
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Publisher Info
Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 21 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 303-316
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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:21:y:2002:i:4:p:303-316

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

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Related research
Keywords: non-point emissions; incentive mechanisms;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Joseph A. Herriges & Ramu Govindasamy & Jason F. Shogren, 1992. "Budget Balancing Incentive Mechanisms," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 92-wp100, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Lars Hansen, 1998. "A Damage Based Tax Mechanism for Regulation of Non-Point Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(1), pages 99-112, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 134-146, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Horan, Richard D. & Shortle, James S. & Abler, David G., 1998. "Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 186-199, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Anastasios Xepapadeas, . "Regulation Of Mineral Emissions Under Assymetric Information," Working Papers 9603, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  6. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Smith, Rodney B.W. & Tomasi, Theodore D., 1995. "Transaction Costs And Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water Pollution Control Policies," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 20(02), December. [Downloadable!]
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