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• Andrew Hughes Hallett

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Change and Restructuring.

Volume (Year): 41 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-28
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Handle: RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:41:y:2008:i:1:p:1-28

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Related research

Keywords: Stackelberg leadership; Institutional coordination; Debt rules; Robust policies; E52; E61; F42;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Woodford, Michael, 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 67(0), pages 1-35, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Woodford, M., 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia.," Papers 666, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Woodford, Michael, 2000. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," Seminar Papers 666, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
   • Michael Woodford, 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," NBER Working Papers 7261, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Michael Woodford, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy inertia," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
2. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2003. "Independent Monetary Policies and Social Equality," Working Papers 0307, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana N., 2004. "Independent monetary policies and social equity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 103-110, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 575, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December. [Downloadable!]
4. Marco Buti & Paul van den Noord, 2003. "Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Elections: The Experience of the Early Years of EMU," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 351, OECD, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
5. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Policy Games and the Optimal Design of Central Banks," Working Papers 0220, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
6. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Libich, Jan & Stehlík, Petr, 2007. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction with Various Degrees and Types of Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 6586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jan Libich & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Petr Stehlik, 2007. "Monetary And Fiscal Policy Interaction With Various Degrees And Types Of Commitment," CAMA Working Papers 2007-21, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
7. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2000. " Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 247-69, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1996. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union," Research Memoranda 004, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
   • Beetsma, Roel & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Discussion Paper 58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
8. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Uhlig, H., 1997. "An analysis of the "stability pact"," Discussion Paper 59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1997. "An Analysis of the 'Stability Pact'," CEPR Discussion Papers 1669, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Tatiana Kirsanova & Sven Jari Stehn & David Vines, 2005. "The Interactions between Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(4), pages 532-564, Winter.
10. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2005. "Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," German Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design," Working Papers 0202, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    • Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002. "Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    Other versions:
    • Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225. [Downloadable!]
12. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2007. "Fiscal leadership and central bank design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(2), pages 607-627, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Barro, Robert J, 1981. "Output Effects of Government Purchases," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(6), pages 1086-1121, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Robert J. Barro, 1980. "Output Effects of Government Purchases," NBER Working Papers 0432, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," DELTA Working Papers 95-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    • Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," Discussion Paper 59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
16. Jacob Frenkel & Morris Goldstein & Paul Masson, 1990. "The Rationale for, and Effects of, International Economic Policy Coordination," NBER Chapters, in: International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations, pages 9-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
17. Nikola Bokan & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2007. "The Impact of Tax, Product and Labour Market Distortions on the Phillips Curve and the Natural Rate of Unemployment," Kiel Working Papers 1336, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Bokan, Nikola & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2007. "The Impact of Tax, Product and Labour Market Distortions on the Phillips Curve and the Natural Rate of Unemployment," Economics Discussion Papers 2007-42, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
18. Dixit, Avinash, 2001. "Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 589-613, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2004. "Post-Thatcher Fiscal Strategies in the U.K.: An Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]

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