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Sustainable fiscal policies and budgetary risk under alternative monetary policy arrangements

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  • Andrew Hughes Hallett

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10644-008-9036-6
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Change and Restructuring.

Volume (Year): 41 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-28

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:41:y:2008:i:1:p:1-28

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=113294

Related research

Keywords: Stackelberg leadership; Institutional coordination; Debt rules; Robust policies; E52; E61; F42;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. von Hagen, Jürgen, 2003. "Fiscal discipline and growth in Euroland: Experiences with the stability and growth pact," ZEI Working Papers B 06-2003, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  2. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2005. "Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, 02.
  3. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
  4. Reinhard Neck & Jan-Egbert Sturm (ed.), 2008. "Sustainability of Public Debt," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262140985, January.
  5. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December.
  6. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  7. Jacob Frenkel & Morris Goldstein & Paul Masson, 1990. "The Rationale for, and Effects of, International Economic Policy Coordination," NBER Chapters, in: International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations, pages 9-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Barro, Robert J, 1981. "Output Effects of Government Purchases," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(6), pages 1086-1121, December.
  9. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2000. " Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 247-69, March.
  10. Jan Libich & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Petr Stehlik, 2007. "Monetary And Fiscal Policy Interaction With Various Degrees And Types Of Commitment," CAMA Working Papers 2007-21, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  11. Woodford, M., 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia.," Papers 666, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  12. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2007. "Fiscal leadership and central bank design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(2), pages 607-627, May.
  13. Marco Buti & Paul van den Noord, 2003. "Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Elections: The Experience of the Early Years of EMU," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 351, OECD Publishing.
  14. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Policy Games and the Optimal Design of Central Banks," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0220, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  15. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
  16. Persson, Mats & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1987. "Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1419-31, November.
  17. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-30, October.
  18. Tatiana Kirsanova & Sven Jari Stehn & David Vines, 2005. "The Interactions between Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(4), pages 532-564, Winter.
  19. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August.
  20. Nikola Bokan & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2007. "The Impact of Tax, Product and Labour Market Distortions on the Phillips Curve and the Natural Rate of Unemployment," Kiel Working Papers 1336, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  21. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana N., 2004. "Independent monetary policies and social equity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 103-110, October.
  22. Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. & Beetsma, R.M.W.J., 1997. "An Analysis of the Stability Pact," Discussion Paper 1997-59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  23. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2004. "Post-Thatcher Fiscal Strategies in the U.K.: An Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1372, CESifo Group Munich.
  24. Woodford, Michael, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy inertia," CFS Working Paper Series 1999/09, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  25. Dixit, Avinash, 2001. "Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 589-613, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Vitor Castro & Ricardo M. Sousa, 2010. "How Do Central Banks React to Wealth Composition and Asset Prices?," GEMF Working Papers 2010-19, GEMF - Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra.
  2. Agnello, Luca & Castro, Vítor & Sousa, Ricardo M., 2012. "How does fiscal policy react to wealth composition and asset prices?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 874-890.
  3. Luca Agnello & Gilles Dufrénot & Ricardo M. Sousa, 2012. "Adjusting the U.S. Fiscal Policy for Asset Prices: Evidence from a TVP-MS Framework," NIPE Working Papers 20/2012, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.

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