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• Paul Joseph Van den Noord

An early criticism of the Stability and Growth Pact has pointed to its asymmetric nature and the weak mechanisms to prevent politically-motivated fiscal policies: its constraints would bite in downswings but not in upswings, especially if in the latter the electoral cycle increases the temptation to run expansionary policies. We find that the experience of the initial years of EMU lends support to this criticism. Overall, unlike the experience in the run-up to EMU, fiscal policies had an expansionary bias, and a “genuine” discretionary boost took place in correspondence to political elections. Both sign and composition of such discretionary changes are in line with the predictions of the recent literature on electoral budget cycles. Closer fiscal surveillance may help detect early such behaviour, but it is unlikely to curb the incentives to run politically-motivated fiscal policies when elections approach ...

Politique budgétaire discrétionnaire et élections : L’expérience des premières années de l’UEM

D’emblée, le pacte de stabilité et de croissance a été critiqué pour son caractère asymétrique et la faiblesse de ses mécanismes destinés à empêcher les mesures budgétaires à finalité politique : ses contraintes seraient efficaces en période de ralentissement économique, mais pas en période d’accélération, surtout lorsque, dans ce dernier cas, le cycle électoral accroît la tentation d’une politique expansionniste. Notre constat est le suivant : l’expérience des premières années de l’UEM confirme ces critiques. Au total, contrairement à ce qu’on a pu observer durant les années qui ont précédé l’UEM, les politiques budgétaires ont connu un biais expansionniste et il y a eu véritablement expansion budgétaire parallèlement aux élections politiques. Ces changements discrétionnaires sont conformes tant en ce qui concerne leur signe que leur composition à ce que pouvaient laisser prévoir les ouvrages récents consacrés au cycle électoral des budgets. Une surveillance budgétaire plus ...

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Paper provided by OECD Economics Department in its series OECD Economics Department Working Papers with number 351.

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Date of creation: 03 Mar 2003
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Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:351-en

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Keywords: fiscal policy politique budgétaire Economic and Monetary Union Union économique et monétaire stability and growth pact political business cycle elections pacte de stabilité et de croissance cycle politique élections

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

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1. Gábor P. Kiss, 2007. "Pain or Gain? Short-term Budgetary Effects of Surprise Inflation - the Case of Hungary," MNB Occasional Papers 2007/61, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (The Central Bank of Hungary). [Downloadable!]
2. J. de Haan & H. Berger & D. Jansen, 2003. "The end of the stability and growth pact?," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 748, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jakob de Haan & Helge Berger & David-Jan Jansen, 2003. "The End of the Stability and Growth Pact?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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   Other versions:
   • António Afonso, 2005. "Ricardian fiscal regimes in the European Union," Working Paper Series 558, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
   • António Afonso, 2008. "Ricardian fiscal regimes in the European Union," Empirica, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 313-334, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Silika Prohl & Friedrich G. Schneider, 2006. "Sustainability of Public Debt and Budget Deficit: Panel cointegration analysis for the European Union Member countries," Economics working papers 2006-10, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
6. Cousins, Mel, 2007. "Political budget cycles and social security budget increases in the Republic of Ireland, 1923-2005," MPRA Paper 5359, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
7. Carlos Mulas-Granados & Emanuele Baldacci & Benedict J. Clements & Sanjeev Gupta, 2004. "Front-Loaded or Back-Loaded Fiscal Adjustments: What Works in Emerging Market Economies?," IMF Working Papers 04/157, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
8. Thierry Warin & Kenneth Donahue, 2006. "The Stability and Growth Pact: A European Answer to the Political Budget Cycle?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0606, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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