Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Antisocial Motivations

Contents:

Author Info

  • Lorenz Goette

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Lausanne, Internef, 1015 Lausanne-Dorigny, Switzerland)

  • David Huffman

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19081)

  • Stephan Meier

    ()
    (Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027)

  • Matthias Sutter

    ()
    (Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria; and Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, 40530 Gothenburg, Sweden)

Abstract

Firms are often organized into groups. Group membership has been shown empirically to have positive effects, in the form of increased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. This includes an enhanced willingness to engage in altruistic punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and instead, out-group members are punished harder and regardless of whether they cooperate or defect. Our results point to a mechanism that might help explain previous mixed results on the social value of punishment, and they contribute to understanding the sources of conflict between groups. They also point to an important trade-off for firms: introducing competition enhances within-group efficiency but also generates costly between-group conflict. This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, decision analysis.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1466
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.

Volume (Year): 58 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 (May)
Pages: 948-960

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:58:y:2012:i:5:p:948-960

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 7240 Parkway Drive, Suite 300, Hanover, MD 21076 USA
Phone: +1-443-757-3500
Fax: 443-757-3515
Email:
Web page: http://www.informs.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: group decisions; cooperation; punishment; experiment; army;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kei Tsutsui & Daniel John Zizzo, 2010. "Group status, minorities, and trust," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 10-10, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  2. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2013. "The Impact of Management Incentives in Intergroup Contests," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-26, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  3. Faillo, Marco & Grieco, Daniela & Zarri, Luca, 2013. "Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 271-283.
  4. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2013. "The Impact of Management Incentives in Intergroup Contests," TWI Research Paper Series 87, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  5. Loukas Balafoutas & Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2014. "The Hidden Costs of Tax Evasion - Collaborative Tax Evasion in Markets for Expert Services," Working Papers 2014-01, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  6. Thomas Buser & Anna Dreber, 2013. "The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-190/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Weng, Qian & Carlsson, Fredrik, 2013. "Cooperation in teams: the role of identity, punishment and endowment distribution," Working Papers in Economics 551, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  8. Weng, Qian, 2013. "Session Size and its Effect on Identity Building: Evidence from a public goods experiment," Working Papers in Economics 560, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  9. Eisenkopf, Gerald, 2013. "Management Impact in an Experimental Intergroup Contest," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79863, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  10. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Oechssler, Jörg & Shah, Anwar, 2014. "Hierarchy, coercion, and exploitation: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 155-168.
  11. Eisenkopf, Gerald, 2014. "The impact of management incentives in intergroup contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 42-61.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:58:y:2012:i:5:p:948-960. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.