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Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange

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Author Info
Oliver E. Williamson
Michael L. Wachter
Jeffrey E. Harris

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with jobs for which nontrivial job-specific skills and task-specific knowledge evolve, in a learning by doing fashion, during the course of a worker's employment. Otherwise qualified but inexperienced workers cannot be regarded as the equivalent of job incumbents under such circumstances. The underlying factors that give rise to job idiosyncracies and the contractual properties of four alternative contracting modes for jobs of this kind are evaluated with the assistance of what we refer to as the "organizational failures framework." Individualistic contracting modes of the contingent claims contracting, spot contracting, and authority relation types are examined. The implied demands on the rationality limits of human actors are shown to be severe and the associated costs of adapting to changing job and market circumstances are shown to be considerable for jobs of the idiosyncratic kind. Collectivizing the employment agreement alleviates these conditions in that it serves to economize on transaction costs in both bounded rationality and attenuate opportunism. The upshot is that "internal labor markets," which others have interpreted in mainly noneconomic terms, can be supplied with an efficiency rationale -- additionally if not instead.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (1975)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 250-278
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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:6:y:1975:i:spring:p:250-278

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Web page: http://www.rje.org

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  1. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2003. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 216-240, March. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency," UCLA Economics Working Papers 286, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Edoardo Mollona & David Hales, 2006. "Knowledge-Based Jobs and the Boundaries of Firms Agent-based Simulation of Firms Learning and Workforce Skill Set Dynamics," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 35-62, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John Haltiwanger, 1982. "Specific CApital, Long Term Implicit Contracts, and Temporary Layoffs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 245, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Janet Currie & Mehdi Farsi & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2003. "Cut to the Bone? Hospital Takeovers and Nurse Employment Contracts," NBER Working Papers 9428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Marjit, Sugata & Maiti, Dibyendu S., 2005. "Globalization, Reform and the Informal Sector," Working Papers RP2005/12, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  7. C. R. Waits & R. L. Greenfield, 1980. "Human Capital Theory and Retirement Income," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 99-105, April. [Downloadable!]
  8. John Haltiwanger, 1982. "The Distinguishing Characteristics of Temporary and Permanent Layoffs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 273, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Gerlach, Knut & Levine, David & Stephan, Gesine & Struck, Olaf, 2006. "The acceptability of layoffs and pay cuts : comparing North America with Germany," IAB Discussion Paper 200601, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany]. [Downloadable!]
  10. Acharya, Viral V. & Baghai-Wadji, Ramin & Subramanian, Krishnamurthy, 2009. "Labor Laws and Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7171, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Büchel, Felix & Neubäumer, Renate, 2001. "Ausbildungsinadäquate Beschäftigung als Folge branchenspezifischer Ausbildungsstrategien (Employment that is inappropriate for the qualifications as a consequence of industry-specific training strat," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 34(3), pages 269-285. [Downloadable!]
  12. Mumcu, Ayşe, 1999. "Strategic Disclosure of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining," MPRA Paper 1913, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
  13. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1998. "Job Characteristics and the Form of Compensation," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-08, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  15. Son Kim & Cheng-Zhong Qin & Yan Yu, 2004. "Bribery in Rank-Order Tournaments," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp1-03, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  16. Gilroy, Bernard Michael & Gries, Thomas & Naudé, Willem & Schmidt, Karl-Heinz & Bauer, Norbert, 2001. "Multinational Enterprises in Africa - A Study of German Firms in South Africa," MPRA Paper 17868, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  17. Wolfgang Pollan, 1980. "Wage rigidity and the structure of the Austrian manufacturing industry," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 116(4), pages 697-728, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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