Strategic Trade Policy under Incomplete Information
AbstractThis paper examines equilibrium trade policies when firms have better information than governments about the profitability of the industry. Contrary to the intuition that the policymakers' lack of information should reduce their incentives to engage in strategic trade intervention, the analysis suggests that information asymmetries may increase trade policy distortions in equilibrium and ultimately worsen the "prisoners dilemma" between governments. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 40 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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Other versions of this item:
- Maggi, G., 1997. "Strategic Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information," Papers 189, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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- Cecile Aubert & Jerome Pouyet, 2000. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information and Institutional Incompleteness," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0806, Econometric Society.
- Mustafa Caglayan & Murat Usman, 2004.
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- Kim, Young-Han & Kim, Sang-Kee, 2012. "Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 614-620.
- Anthony Creane & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2005.
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0530, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
- Creane, Anthony & Miyagiwa, Kaz, 2008. "Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 229-244, May.
- Anthony Creane & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2007. "Information and Disclosure in Strategic Trade Policy," ISER Discussion Paper 0705, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Sun, Ning & Yao, Hongxin, 2011. "Manipulable behavior in international trade," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 60-66, January.
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