Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy

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Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy

Author Info

Creane, Anthony
Miyagiwa, Kaz

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Abstract

We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms' incentive to disclose information to the governments in the Brander-Spencer setting. With quantity competition, we find firms disclosing both demand and cost information, thereby justifying the literature's omniscient-government assumption. With price competition, however, firms have no incentives to disclose demand or cost information, so governments remain uninformed. Further, with quantity competition and unknown demand, governments are caught in an informational prisoner's dilemma.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 75 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 229-244
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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:75:y:2008:i:1:p:229-244

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

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Paper
- Anthony Creane & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2007. "Information and Disclosure in Strategic Trade Policy," ISER Discussion Paper 0705, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
- Anthony Creane & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2005. "Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy," Emory Economics 0530, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Xavier Vives, 1990. "Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 409-430, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Anthony Creane & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2009. "Foreign direct investment and the welfare effects of cost harmonization," Emory Economics 0905, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Anthony Creane & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2009. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Welfare Effects of Cost Harmonization," ISER Discussion Paper 0741, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]

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