Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy: Revisited
AbstractIn a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) show that the mode of competition (quantity or price) determines whether information sharing occurs between firms and governments within an international duopoly context in which the fims are located in different countries. In this paper, we show that the relative number of firms located in each country is also critical. In particular, we illustrate that with quantity competition and under the presence of demand and cost uncertainty information sharing does not occur when the number of firms in one country is higher than the number of firms in the other country. Moreover, we show that the informational prisoner's dilemma in the current context appears only when the number of firms across countries is equal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32949.
Date of creation: 22 Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Information; uncertainty; strategic trade; multiple firms;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-08-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2011-08-29 (Economics of Strategic Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anthony Creane & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2007.
"Information and Disclosure in Strategic Trade Policy,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0705, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Creane, Anthony & Miyagiwa, Kaz, 2008. "Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 229-244, May.
- Anthony Creane & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2005. "Information and Disclosure in Strategic Trade Policy," Emory Economics 0530, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
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"Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
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- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984.
"Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,"
NBER Working Papers
1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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