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Collective Properties of Trentino: From Traditional Competences to Modern Solution Providers

Author

Listed:
  • Alisia Tognon

    (Dipartimento di Architettura e Studi Urbani (DAStU)-Politecnico di Milano, 20133 Milano, Italy
    Laboratorio di Storia delle Alpi (LabiSAlp), Accademia di Architettura, Università della Svizzera Italiana (USI), 6850 Mendrisio, Switzerland)

  • Nicola Martellozzo

    (Department of Foreign Languages, Literature and Modern Cultures-University of Turin, 10125 Torino, Italy
    Centro Universitario (GREEN) Groupe de Recherche en Education à l’Environnement et à la Nature, l’Università della Valle d’Aosta—Université de la Vallée d’Aoste, 11100 Aosta, Italy)

  • Alessandro Gretter

    (Centro Universitario (GREEN) Groupe de Recherche en Education à l’Environnement et à la Nature, l’Università della Valle d’Aosta—Université de la Vallée d’Aoste, 11100 Aosta, Italy
    Research and Innovation Centre-Fondazione Edmund Mach, San Michele all’Adige, 38098 Trento, Italy)

Abstract

This paper focuses on the context of the Autonomous Province of Trento in Northern Italy, which has hosted common regime institutions that manage collective mountain properties daily since the 13th century. These institutions operate in the most significant part of the territory and adapt their routines to emerging challenges. From different scientific perspectives (economic, anthropological, and architectural), we analyzed how this method has been actualized as the most effective management of local resources, generating opportunities for commoners, new citizens, and external users. This includes the exposure of the communities to novel economic activities, adaptation of the internal normative and planning systems, and reflection on how to combine natural resources with local needs and global scenarios.

Suggested Citation

  • Alisia Tognon & Nicola Martellozzo & Alessandro Gretter, 2023. "Collective Properties of Trentino: From Traditional Competences to Modern Solution Providers," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-20, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlands:v:12:y:2023:i:1:p:218-:d:1030785
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Gios, Geremia & Santuari, Alceste, 2002. "Agricultural Cooperatives in the County of Trento (Italy): Economic, Organizational and Legal Perspectives," Journal of Rural Cooperation, Hebrew University, Center for Agricultural Economic Research, vol. 30(1), pages 1-10.
    4. De Moor,Tine, 2017. "The Dilemma of the Commoners," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316645826.
    5. Casari, Marco & Plott, Charles R., 2003. "Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 217-247, June.
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