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A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations

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  • Wright, Peter
  • Mukherji, Ananda
  • Kroll, Mark J.

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  • Wright, Peter & Mukherji, Ananda & Kroll, Mark J., 2001. "A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 413-429.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:30:y:2001:i:5:p:413-429
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    Cited by:

    1. Jacek Miroński, 2005. "Relacja agencji w teorii przedsiębiorstwa," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 4, pages 1-16.
    2. Mohammad Tareq & Muhammad Nurul Houqe & Tony van Zijl, 2021. "Governance of tunnelling in developing countries: evidence from Bangladesh," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(2), pages 3031-3051, June.
    3. Saam, Nicole J., 2007. "Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 825-840, December.
    4. Pieper, Torsten M., 2010. "Non solus: Toward a psychology of family business," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 26-39, March.
    5. Hannah S. Lee & David A. Griffith, 2012. "Comparative insights into the governance problems of agency theory: the influence of institutional environment on the basic human tenets," AMS Review, Springer;Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 2(1), pages 19-33, March.
    6. Jose Arias-Pérez & Geovanny Perdomo-Charry & Carlos Castaño-Ríos, 2017. "Not-Invented-Here Syndrome And Innovation Performance: The Confounding Effect Of Innovation Capabilities As Organisational Routines In Service Firms," International Journal of Innovation Management (ijim), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 21(01), pages 1-20, January.
    7. Parag, Yael & Darby, Sarah, 2009. "Consumer-supplier-government triangular relations: Rethinking the UK policy path for carbon emissions reduction from the UK residential sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 3984-3992, October.
    8. Shandana Shoaib & Bahaudin G. Mujtaba, 2018. "Perverse Incentives and Peccable Behavior in Professionals - A Qualitative Study of the Faculty," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 441-459, December.
    9. Islam, Nazrul & Wang, Qidong & Marinakis, Yorgos & Walsh, Steven, 2022. "Family enterprise and technological innovation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 208-221.
    10. J. Faíña & Antonio García-Lorenzo & Jesús López-Rodríguez, 2006. "European integration from the agency theory perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 5-12, January.
    11. Guidice, Rebecca M. & Mero, Neal P. & Greene, Juanne V., 2013. "Perceptions of accountability in family business: Using accountability theory to understand differences between family and nonfamily executives," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 233-244.
    12. Shandana Shoaib & Yehuda Baruch, 2019. "Deviant Behavior in a Moderated-Mediation Framework of Incentives, Organizational Justice Perception, and Reward Expectancy," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 617-633, July.
    13. Stephen, Andrew T. & Coote, Leonard V., 2007. "Interfirm behavior and goal alignment in relational exchanges," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 285-295, April.
    14. Daniel N. Jones & Robert D. Hare, 2016. "The Mismeasure of Psychopathy: A Commentary on Boddy’s PM-MRV," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 579-588, October.
    15. Onjewu, Adah-Kole Emmanuel & Walton, Nigel & Koliousis, Ioannis, 2023. "Blockchain agency theory," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    16. Mukherji, Ananda & Wright, Peter & Mukherji, Jyotsna, 2007. "Cohesiveness and goals in agency networks: Explaining conflict and cooperation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 949-964, December.
    17. Antonio Lorenzo, 2003. "The Role of Interest Groups in the European Union Decision-Making Process," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 251-261, May.
    18. Chamorro, Eva & Cámara, Macario, 2016. "Relación de agencia y monopolio. El caso del tabaco en España (1887-1986)," Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 132-141.
    19. Nie, Hongguang & Kemp, René & Xu, Jin-Hua & Vasseur, Véronique & Fan, Ying, 2020. "Split incentive effects on the adoption of technical and behavioral energy-saving measures in the household sector in Western Europe," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    20. Eva Jansson, 0. "Deregulation, property rights, and legal system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-25.

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