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Corporate governance and corporate agility

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  • Lehn, Kenneth

Abstract

This paper suggests the topic of corporate agility as a fruitful area for corporate governance research. Corporate agility, which refers to a firms ability to adapt to changes in its environment, is likely to be a critical, yet understudied, determinant of firm performance and survival. This paper proposes an inverse relation between the centralization of decision-making in firms and agility. It also proposes that certain governance structures often viewed as increasing agency costs, such as insider-controlled boards and dual class stock, may actually increase agility and thereby improve firm performance and the chances of survival. The paper concludes with a discussion of specific ways in which agility might be incorporated into the corporate governance literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Lehn, Kenneth, 2021. "Corporate governance and corporate agility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s092911992100050x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101929
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Raminta Benetyte & Halit Gonenc & Rytis Krusinskas, 2021. "Corporate Governance vs. Financial Performance for Intensity of Innovation Investments," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-13, April.
    2. Hutton, Irena & Knill, April M. & Zutter, Chad J., 2021. "25 years and counting of corporate finance: What have we learned and where are we going?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    3. Syeda Humayra Abedin & Silima Subha & Mumtaheena Anwar & Md. Nurul Kabir & Yasean A. Tahat & Mohammed Hossain, 2023. "Environmental Performance and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Japan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-20, February.
    4. Omrane Guedhami & April Knill & William Megginson & Lemma W. Senbet, 2023. "Economic impact of COVID-19 across national boundaries: The role of government responses," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 54(7), pages 1278-1297, September.
    5. Jabbar Sehen Issa & Mohammad Reza Abbaszadeh, 2023. "The Effect of Corporate Governance in Islamic Banking on the Agility of Iraqi Banks," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 16(6), pages 1-22, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Agility; Decentralization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

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