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Une analyse de la notion d'informel en gestion : des contrats aux réseaux sociaux dans les organisations

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  • Fabienne Alvarez

    (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UA - Université des Antilles)

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  • Fabienne Alvarez, 2002. "Une analyse de la notion d'informel en gestion : des contrats aux réseaux sociaux dans les organisations," Post-Print hal-02545366, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02545366
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02545366
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nathalie Guibert & Yves Dupuy, 1997. "La complémentarité entre contrôle « formel » et contrôle « informel » : le cas de la relation client-fournisseur," Comptabilité - Contrôle - Audit, Association francophone de comptabilité, vol. 3(1), pages 39-52.
    2. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    3. Whitley, R., 1999. "Firms, institutions and management control: the comparative analysis of coordination and control systems," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 24(5-6), pages 507-524, July.
    4. William G. Ouchi, 1979. "A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(9), pages 833-848, September.
    5. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, 1985. "Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 134-149, February.
    6. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1964. "Control in Large Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 397-408, April.
    7. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    8. Edward Lorenz, 1988. "Neither Friends nor Strangers," Post-Print halshs-00483728, HAL.
    9. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-390, June.
    10. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    11. Wintrobe, Ronald & Breton, Albert, 1986. "Organizational Structure and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 530-538, June.
    12. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    13. Williamson, Oliver E, 1993. "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 453-486, April.
    14. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    15. Noorderhaven, N.G., 1992. "The problem of contract enforcement in economic organization theory," Other publications TiSEM 06db09b9-6ffa-4008-afff-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. James G. March & Zur Shapira, 1987. "Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(11), pages 1404-1418, November.
    17. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
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