Does the Composition of the Compensation Committee Influence CEO Compensation Practices?
AbstractCEOs receive preferential treatment, at the expense of shareholders, when corporate insiders are included on the compensation committee. While CEO compensation is not greater, the relation between CEO compensation and corporate performance is more favorable to the CEO with insiders on the compensation committee when corporate performance is poor.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Financial Management Association in its journal Financial Management.
Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (Fall)
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