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Relación de agencia y monopolio. El caso del tabaco en España (1887-1986)

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  • Chamorro, Eva
  • Cámara, Macario

Abstract

Los análisis históricos contables permiten evidenciar, bajo el marco de la teoría de la agencia, los conflictos de intereses que se producen en una organización. Nuestro objetivo, con un estudio longitudinal, basado en fuentes primarias, es comprobar cómo se regula una relación de agencia a través de contratos formales, y el papel que asume la contabilidad. El caso en el que nos basamos, y que puede ser una importante contribución en ese sentido, es el del arrendamiento del monopolio estatal del tabaco a una empresa privada, desde el inicio de la gestión (1887) hasta que empieza a desaparecer esta actividad monopolística (1986). Nuestros hallazgos ponen de manifiesto que los contratos establecidos permiten un gran control del principal sobre el agente y que no se cumplen todas las condiciones que deben darse para considerarlos «un buen acuerdo contractual». Por otro lado, la contabilidad aparece como un instrumento clave para el control del Estado sobre las empresas arrendatarias. Nuestra principal conclusión es que el agente es quien asume mayor riesgo en el arrendamiento, y el principal mantiene un comportamiento oportunista durante todo el periodo, lo que contradice los planteamientos más generalizados de la teoría y permite relajar sus asunciones iniciales.

Suggested Citation

  • Chamorro, Eva & Cámara, Macario, 2016. "Relación de agencia y monopolio. El caso del tabaco en España (1887-1986)," Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 132-141.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:spacre:v:19:y:2016:i:1:p:132-141
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rcsar.2015.03.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agencia; Tabaco; Monopolio estatal; Historia de la contabilidad; Información cualitativa; Análisis longitudinal; Agency; Tobacco; State monopoly; Accounting history; Qualitative information; Longitudinal analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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