Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Socially optimal procurement with tight budgets and rationing

Contents:

Author Info

  • Anthon, Signe
  • Bogetoft, Peter
  • Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-4N6NJVT-1/2/2b0d20dc975d82575b72fbc9a5bcaf8a
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 91 (2007)
Issue (Month): 7-8 (August)
Pages: 1625-1642

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:91:y:2007:i:7-8:p:1625-1642

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Antle, Rick & Bogetoft, Peter & Stark, Andrew W., 2000. "Information Systems, Incentives and the Timing of Investment," Unit of Economics Working papers, Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Food and Resource Economic Institute 24201, Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Food and Resource Economic Institute.
  2. Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
  3. Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1996. "Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-39, January.
  4. Axel Gautier, 2004. "Regulation under Financial Constraints," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 645-656, December.
  5. Thomas, Lionel, 2002. "Non-linear pricing with budget constraint," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 257-263, April.
  6. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
  7. Levaggi, Rosella, 1999. " Optimal Procurement Contracts under a Binding Budget Constraint," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 101(1-2), pages 23-37, October.
  8. Axel Gautier & Manipushpak Mitra, 2006. "Regulating a monopolist with limited funds," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 705-718, 04.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Robert, Jacques, 1996. "Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 181-186, August.
  10. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1981. "Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation," NBER Working Papers 0694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Wilson, Robert B, 1989. "Efficient and Competitive Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, January.
  12. Wijkander, Hans, 1988. "Equity and Efficiency in Public Sector Pricing: A Case for Stochastic Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1455-65, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Philippe Delacote & Charles Palmer & Ryiong Kim Bakkegaard & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, 2014. "Unveiling information on opportunity costs in REDD: Who obtains the surplus when policy objectives differ?," Working Papers 205537, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  2. Tigran Melkonyan & Michael Taylor, 2010. "Regulatory Policy Design for Agroecosystem Management on Public Rangelands," Working Papers, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics;University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics 10-007, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics;University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics.
  3. Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl, 2009. "First-movers, non-movers, and social gains from subsidising entry in markets for nature-based recreational goods," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(8-9), pages 2363-2371, June.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:91:y:2007:i:7-8:p:1625-1642. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.