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A Bureaucrat'S Procurement Strategy: Budget Constraints And Rationing Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Signe ANTHON
Peter BOGETOFT
Bo Jellesmark THORSEN
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We investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. The bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive outside options which are lost upon acceptance of a procurement contract. The setting is relevant for, e.g. governmental agencies. We show how this setup makes probabilistic rationing and overproduction for low-cost agents a useful tool for the bureaucrat. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation © CIRIEC 2007.
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics .
Volume (Year): 78 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Pages: 221-244
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Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:78:y:2007:i:2:p:221-244Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1370-4788
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