1. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Thomas Krichel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 1994. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetised Debt?," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 9403, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Thomas Krichel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 1996. "Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 28-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Alberto Alesina & Vittorio Grilli, 1991. "The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe," NBER Working Papers 3860, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Alesina, Alberto F & Grilli, Vittorio, 1991. "The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 563, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall. [Downloadable!]
6. Levine, Paul L & Pearlman, Joseph, 1992. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under EMU: Credible Inflation Targets or Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic?," CEPR Discussion Papers 701, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
   Other versions:
   • Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225. [Downloadable!]
8. Levine, Paul, 1993. "Fiscal Policy Co-ordination under EMU and the Choice of Monetary Instrument," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(0), pages 1-12, Suppl..
9. Tabellini, Guido, 1986. "Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 427-442, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Carl E. Walsh, 1993. "Optimal contracts for independent central bankers: private information, performance measures and reappointment," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 93-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    Other versions:
    • Carl E Walsh, 1993. "Optimal contracts for independent central bankers: private information, performance measures and reappointment," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Mar.
11. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Guy Debelle, 1996. "Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch?," IMF Working Papers 96/1, International Monetary Fund.

Cited by:
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1. Backhaus,Jürgen G., 1996. "Good economics, bad economics, and European economics," Research Memoranda 006, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
2. Laurent GAGNOL & Moise SIDIROPOULOS, 2001. "The policy mix in a monetary union under alternative policy institutions and asymmetries," Working Papers of BETA 2001-23, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
3. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2008. "Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2009. "Uncertainty and fiscal policy in an asymmetric monetary union," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200913, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
4. Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1995. "The role of public debt in the game of double chicken," Research Memoranda 025, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
5. Brigitte Godbillon & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2001. "Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 163-179, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Xavier Debrun & Francesca Castellani, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 01/205, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
7. Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," DELTA Working Papers 95-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
   • Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," Discussion Paper 59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Discussion Paper 58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1996. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union," Research Memoranda 004, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
   • Beetsma, Roel & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2000. " Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 247-69, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Sven Jari Stehn & David Vines, 2008. "Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt," IMF Working Papers 08/164, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Stehn, Sven Jari & Vines, David, 2008. "Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 6913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Beetsma,Roel M.W.J., 1996. "The Interaction of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Balancing Credibility and Flexibility," Research Memoranda 005, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "The Interaction of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Balancing Credibility and Flexibility," DELTA Working Papers 95-24, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    • Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "The interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union : balancing credibility and flexibility," Discussion Paper 101, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
12. Pompeo Posta & Valeria Bonis, 2009. "Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 241-263, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation," Discussion Paper 112, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Does Monetary Unification Lead to Excessive Debt Accumulation?," DELTA Working Papers 95-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    • Beetsma, Roel & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1995. "Does Monetary Unification Lead to Excessive Debt Accumulation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 1999. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 299-325, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 07/171, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
15. Valeria De Bonis & Pompeo Della Posta, 2005. "Strategic interactions between monetary and fiscal authorities in a monetary union," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 26, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro. [Downloadable!]
16. Francesca Castellani, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and Accountability Under Complete Information," HEI Working Papers 05-2001, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]