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Optimal contracts for independent central bankers: private information, performance measures and reappointment

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Author Info
Carl E. Walsh

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its series Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory with number 93-02.

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Date of creation: 1993
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfap:93-02

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Related research
Keywords: Banks and banking; Central ; Monetary policy - New Zealand ; New Zealand;

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  1. Canadian Macro Study Group
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  1. Ugo Panizza, 1997. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers: Inflation versus Money Supply and Exchange Rate Targets," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 5-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eijffinger, S. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal Commitment in an Open Economy : Credibility vs. Flexibility," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Francesco Papadia & Gian Ruggiero, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-90, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Luis Felipe Céspedes & Rodrigo Valdés, 2006. "Autonomía de Bancos Centrales: La Experiencia Chilena," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 358, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
  5. Eijffinger, S. & Schaling, E., 1995. "The Ultimate Determinants of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in a Second-Best World," Discussion Paper 47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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