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The dire effects of the lack of monetary and fiscal coordination

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  • Bianchi, Francesco
  • Melosi, Leonardo

Abstract

If the government’s willingness to stabilize debt is waning, while the central bank is adamant about keeping inflation low, the economy enters a vicious spiral of higher inflation, monetary tightening, recession, and further debt accumulation. The mere possibility of this conflict represents a drag on the economy. A commitment to inflate away the debt accumulated during a large recession leads to welfare improvements and lower uncertainty by separating long-run fiscal sustainability from the short-run fiscal stimulus. This strategy can be used to avoid the zero lower bound. As a technical contribution, we explain how to build shock-specific policy rules.

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  • Bianchi, Francesco & Melosi, Leonardo, 2019. "The dire effects of the lack of monetary and fiscal coordination," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 1-22.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:104:y:2019:i:c:p:1-22
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.09.001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary and fiscal policies; Coordination; Emergency budget; Markov-switching models; Liquidity traps welfare; Uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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