IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/mateco/v77y2018icp25-31.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Procedurally fair implementation under complete information

Author

Listed:
  • Korpela, Ville

Abstract

We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with the path-braking result of Maskin (1999), and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective.

Suggested Citation

  • Korpela, Ville, 2018. "Procedurally fair implementation under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 25-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:77:y:2018:i:c:p:25-31
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406816301264
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    2. Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 549-563, June.
    3. Sébastien Rouillon, 2013. "Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1179-1203, April.
    4. Moulin, HervÈ, 1997. "Procedural cum Endstate Justice: An Implementation Viewpoint," Working Papers 97-17, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    5. Galbiati, Marco, 2008. "Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 72-75, July.
    6. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    7. Frédéric Gaspart, 2003. "A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 311-322, October.
    8. Guoqiang Tian, 1989. "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 613-621.
    9. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai, 2017. "Discrimination via Symmetric Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 275-314, February.
    10. K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), 2011. "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    11. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    12. Azrieli, Yaron & Jain, Ritesh, 2018. "Symmetric mechanism design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 108-118.
    13. , A., 2010. "Supermodular mechanism design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(3), September.
    14. Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu, 2001. "Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 427-444, June.
    15. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 1997. "Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1215-1220, September.
    16. Yan Chen, 2002. "A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(4), pages 773-790.
    17. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-980, November.
    18. John Pratt, 2007. "Fair (and not so fair) division," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 203-236, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry," Discussion Papers 108, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    2. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
    3. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    4. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    5. Kaname Miyagishima, 2015. "Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(3), pages 247-257, September.
    6. Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
    7. Thomson, William, 2005. "Divide-and-permute," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July.
    8. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1015-1036, November.
    9. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
    10. Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2012. "National implementation with partially honest agents," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    11. Hassan Benchekroun & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2016. "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms," Working Papers halshs-01378460, HAL.
    12. Saptarshi Mukherjee & Hans Peters, 2022. "Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 1009-1028, November.
    13. Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu, 2002. "Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: applications," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 253-276, December.
    14. Jianxin Yi, 2021. "Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 279-288, September.
    15. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    16. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2013. "A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 131-151, September.
    17. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    18. Tian, Guoqiang, 2005. "Implementation in production economies with increasing returns," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 309-325, May.
    19. Guoqiang Tian, 2010. "Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 163-184, March.
    20. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2021. "A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1248, Barcelona School of Economics.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:77:y:2018:i:c:p:25-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.